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1Security and Privacy Analyses of
Internet of Things Children’s Toys
Gordon Chu, Noah Apthorpe, and Nick Feamster
Abstract—This paper investigates the security and privacy of
Internet-connected children’s smart toys through case studies
of three commercially-available products. We conduct network
and application vulnerability analyses of each toy using static
and dynamic analysis techniques, including application binary
decompilation and network monitoring. We discover several pub-
licly undisclosed vulnerabilities that violate the Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA) as well as the toys’ individual
privacy policies. These vulnerabilities, especially security flaws in
network communications with first-party servers, are indicative
of a disconnect between many IoT toy developers and security
and privacy best practices despite increased attention to Internet-
connected toy hacking risks.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Data Security, Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET-connected children’s toys are a subset of IoTdevices that merit special attention from the security com-
munity. If IoT toys are compromised, a cyber predator could
communicate with or collect sensitive data about children
without being physically near them. The 2015 Hello Barbie
hack, in which security researchers were able to remotely ac-
cess the doll’s microphone and record children’s conversations
[1], clearly demonstrates the importance of securing IoT toys.
Regulators have given special attention to privacy con-
cerns of online services targeted toward children. The Federal
Trade Commission’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Rule (COPPA) places specific requirements on these services,
including that they must “establish and maintain reasonable
procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity
of personal information collected from children” [2].
In addition to mandated COPPA compliance, manufacturers
of IoT toys provide their own privacy policies to indicate
data handling practices and security measures specific to their
products. However, consumers have no way to verify whether
IoT toys actually follow COPPA regulations or manufacturer
privacy policies. Recent high-profile hacks of IoT devices give
reason to doubt the security claims of these products [1], [3]–
[5].
In this work, we analyze three commercially-available IoT
toys, a hydration tracker, a smart pet, and a fitness band, for
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application and network security and privacy vulnerabilities.
All three products are clearly targeted towards minors on their
respective websites and the Google Play store. The mobile
application for the hydration tracker toy has 5,000+ installs
from the Google Play store as of July 2018. The mobile
applications for the smart pet and fitness band have 10,000+
and 1,000+ installs, respectively. For comparison, the Hello
Barbie companion app has 5,000+ installs. All analyses in
this paper were performed with the version of the toys and
companion mobile applications available in November, 2017.
We chose these specific toys and mobile applications at the
request of the state attorney general. We have not disclosed
discovered vulnerabilities to the toy vendors due to ongoing
attorney general investigations. The attorney general will no-
tify the vendors when appropriate. We keep the identities of
the toys anonymous in this paper pending security patches.
We uncover several previously undisclosed vulnerabilities,
including a lack of data encryption (HTTP instead of HTTPS),
lack of authentication for accessing personally identifiable
information (PII), POST token reuse, asymmetric HTTP re-
sponses allowing unique ID mining, PII in crash reports to
third parties, and secret keys in source code constant files. We
then identify how these vulnerabilities constitute violations of
both COPPA and the individual toys’ privacy policies.
Despite their potentially serious impact, these vulnerabilities
are all easily correctable. Their existence indicates substantial
developer error, apathy, or ignorance of privacy and security
best practices. Even simple and well-known security practices,
such as transport-layer encryption, are neglected by develop-
ers. These case studies motivate more rigorous auditing of
Internet-connected toys by researchers and consumer advocacy
groups as well as improved development practices by IoT toy
manufacturers.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Presents previously undisclosed vulnerabilities of three
Internet-connected children’s toys, informing general ob-
servations about the current state of smart toy security
and privacy:
– Lack of industry-standard security practices, espe-
cially encryption/authentication of communications
with first-party cloud services, leaves personal data
unprotected and constitutes violations of manufac-
turer privacy policies and federal COPPA regulation.
– Use of common third-party analytics services across
smart toys could allow cross-device tracking of child
behavior.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
02
75
1v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
9 A
ug
 20
18
2II. RELATED WORK
Recent high-profile hacks of smart toys [1], [5], have drawn
considerable press attention to the privacy and security risks of
Internet-connected devices for children [6], [7]. The academic
community has responded to consumer concern with studies
auditing smart toys [3], [8]–[10], analyzing children’s and
parents’ interactions with smart toys [11], [12], and proposing
technical and legal frameworks or requirements for improving
smart toy security and privacy [13]–[17]. This work fits
into the general methodological framework of previous toy
security audits in that it systematically explores vulnerabilities
in consumer smart toys, provides proof-of-concept exploits,
and suggests remediation techniques. However, unlike most
previous studies, this work situates discovered vulnerabilities
in the context of federal COPPA regulation and the examined
toys’ respective privacy policies. By doing so, it provides
a glimpse into how IoT toy developers’ practices can fail
to match their own privacy promises or adhere to federal
regulations. These results corroborate the findings of Reyes
et al. [18] that many Android applications targeted toward
children are potentially in violation of COPPA.
III. METHOD
We evaluate the security of three commercially-available
IoT toys: a hydration tracker, a smart pet, and a fitness band.
None of the toys have publicly disclosed vulnerabilities.
We evaluate each toy with static and dynamic analyses to
understand its functionality and to discover application and
network security vulnerabilities. Finally, we check whether any
discovered vulnerabilities violate the toys’ privacy policies or
COPPA.
Our approach involves commonly used tools for penetration
testing and security auditing, emphasizing the breadth and
severity of smart toy vulnerabilities that can be discovered
using these methods, which are publicly available and have a
low barrier to use for potential attackers. The vulnerabilities
reported are unlikely comprehensive—future research using
more sophisticated techniques, such as taint tracking [19],
may uncover additional vulnerabilities; however, we focus on
the highest impact issues that are both easily detectable by
attackers and easily correctable by manufacturers.
A. Static Analysis
We collected publicly-available documentation about each
toy, including user manuals and privacy policies. We examined
the documentation to understand the capabilities of each toy
and to learn which discovered vulnerabilities violate its privacy
policy.
We also decompiled the Android mobile application asso-
ciated with each toy using the jadx Dex to Java compiler
[20]. We examined the source code for security vulnerabilities,
such as cleartext passwords, network serialization formats, and
metadata about developers.
Fig. 1: Packet capture pipeline for recording IoT toy network
traffic. All toys were connected to an instrumented WiFi access
point implemented on a Raspberry Pi.
B. Dynamic Analysis
We collected packet captures from the toys by associating
them with an instrumented WiFi access point implemented on
a Raspberry Pi (Figure 1) [21]. HTTPS traffic was decrypted
using mitmproxy [22]. The command line utility tshark [23]
was run on the Raspberry Pi to log packets to disk. Recorded
packet traces were then analyzed visually with wireshark [24]
and programmatically with the Python Scapy library [25]. We
focused on traffic between the toys and backend cloud servers
because it is easy to intercept and subject to the widest range
of attacks. Security and privacy evaluations of non-WiFi local
communications (Bluetooth, Zigbee, etc.) remain a topic for
future work.
We also used the network mapper nmap [26] to determine
what ports were open on the toys. No port scans were launched
against remote servers that the toys communicated with, as
scanning permission was neither requested of nor granted from
the respective site owners
IV. HYDRATION TRACKER
The hydration tracker consists of a physical water bottle
designed for child use and an associated mobile application.
The hydration tracker was released in 2016, and the mobile
application has 5,000+ installs from the Google Play store as
of July 2018. An alternative version of the water bottle was
released in 2018 with additional features, indicating continued
sales of the toy. The user, likely a child, can create a profile on
the application, and after entering biographical and personal
information such as name, age, weight, and height, a water
consumption goal is computed. Water consumed from the
bottle is logged and can be viewed from within the application.
The water bottle has a graphical interface for monitoring daily
consumption goals. The user can also add a profile picture
that appears inside the application. This photo is likely of the
child, although privacy-conscious users may choose a non-
identifying photo.
A. Network Behavior
The water bottle is equipped with an 802.11 b/g/n WiFi
card, but no Bluetooth functionality. The mobile application,
by virtue of running on a smartphone, can communicate via
WiFi and Bluetooth.
3Fig. 2: Hosts communicating with the hydration tracker by
percentage of bytes transferred over a 5-minute traffic record-
ing.
Decompiling the mobile application source code revealed
numerous imported libraries for communication with third-
party analytics and performance monitoring services. These
services include Yahoo’s Flurry Analytics1, Google Analytics2,
Crashlytics3, and a Chinese analytics platform.4
Summary flow statistics reveal that the hydration tracker
communicates with approximately 12 remote hosts. Figure 2
plots these hosts weighted by how many bytes they exchanged
with the hydration tracker. The hosts fall into two categories:
servers belonging to the manufacturer of the toy and servers
providing third-party analytics and performance monitoring.
All of the HTTP connections to third-party platforms were
encrypted over SSL, and all connections to manufacturer-
owned servers were unencrypted, vanilla HTTP.
B. Vulnerabilities
Analysis of the hydration tracker revealed several vulnera-
bilities, primarily due to lack of encryption and authentication
of HTTP sessions.
1) HTTP Communications with Cloud Servers: All com-
munications between the hydration tracker and manufacturer-
owned servers occur via unencrypted and unauthenticated
HTTP GET and POST requests. These communications in-
clude requests for static content, such as background images
in the application, as well as for dynamic content related to
user behaviors. When the user drinks from the water bottle,
the bottle makes a HTTP POST request to report the event.
An attacker could easily observe the contents of these requests,
learn when a user is interacting with the device, and/or spoof a
response with arbitrary content (Figure 3a). This content could
contain executable data that triggers remote code execution in
the application or smart water bottle.
1https://developer.yahoo.com/analytics/
2https://analytics.google.com/
3http://try.crashlytics.com
4https://www.jiguang.cn
Unencrypted HTTP GET requests are also used to fetch
the user’s profile picture upon loading or restarting the mobile
application. An adversary could eavesdrop on these communi-
cations and observe the profile photographs of children using
the hydration tracker, a clear privacy breach (Figure 3b).
2) POST Token Reuse: In addition to being unencrypted,
POST requests from the hydration tracker reporting drinking
events reuse an authentication token transmitted as an HTTP
header (this appears to be a custom header as it is not specified
in the relevant HTTP RFCs). An attacker could observe the
token of a legitimate user by eavesdropping a valid request and
then spoof valid requests to the server with arbitrary content
(Figure 3c). This could allow remote code execution on the
server and be used as an attack vector to dump the server’s
database filled with sensitive user data.
Securing POST requests with HTTPS would not prevent
request spoofing. If an attacker was able to guess a valid token,
they could establish their own secure session to the server and
continue spoofing requests pretending to be a legitimate user.
The tokens used for these POST requests should have a time-
to-live and be periodically refreshed to minimize the window
of opportunity an attacker has to exploit a valid token.
3) No Authentication for User Profile Photos: HTTP GET
requests for user profile pictures are not only unencrypted,
but also unauthenticated. An attacker able to generate valid
requests could receive the profile pictures of any hydration
tracker user anywhere in the world, even if the attacker is not
able to directly eavesdrop hydration tracker communications.
Even if the hydration tracker were updated to use HTTPS,
this vulnerability would not be solved. An attacker could
just make an HTTPS connection to the server and spoof the
GET request over an encrypted connection (Figure 3d). An
authentication mechanism is necessary to verify that that user
making the request has access rights to the profile picture.
4) Continued Availability of Overwritten Profile Photos:
After a user overwrites their current profile picture with a
new one, their old profile picture is still accessible via the
original HTTP GET request. This is functionally unnecessary,
as there is currently no feature of the application to switch to
a previous profile photo. Moreover, this continued availability
makes the window of opportunity for an attacker to obtain
a profile photo via sniffing or spoofing essentially infinite,
in addition to needlessly polluting the space of valid photo
tokens and thus increasing the chances of a random guess
corresponding to a valid token.
5) Asymmetric HTTP Response Codes Allow Profile Photo
ID Discovery: HTTP GET requests for user profile picture
contain a unique 12-character identification token. However,
requests with a truncated 3-character token receive differen-
tiated responses depending on whether the 3 characters are a
prefix of a legitimate token. Specifically, prefixes of real user
tokens yield HTTP 301 Moved Permanently response codes,
while prefixes of invalid tokens yield HTTP 404 Not Found
response codes. Combined with the previously described lack
of authentication for profile photo GET requests, this imple-
mentation flaw substantially reduces the time required to guess
valid picture tokens (Section IV-C).
4(a) A malicious actor observing an unencrypted GET re-
quest and spoofing the response with a malicious payload.
(b) A malicious actor observing personally-identifiable
information in an unencrypted server response.
(c) A malicious actor obtaining a valid token from a
POST request and spoofing a new request to the server
with a malicious payload.
(d) A malicious actor observing a GET request and
spoofing it to the server to receive a response.
Fig. 3: Malicious actions enabled by discovered security
vulnerabilties.
Fig. 4: Excerpt of crash report containing sensitive information
sent to a third-party analytics service from the hydration
tracker toy.
6) Personally Identifiable Information in Crash Reports:
During a transient network error, the mobile application sends
a crash report to a third-party analytics platform containing
personally identifiable information, including the name, gen-
der, birthday, and weight of the user (Figure 4). Although this
information was sent encrypted over HTTPS, it is unlikely that
a third-party analytics platform needs this sensitive data. The
application should exclude these data from crash reports.
Fig. 5: Example HTTP GET request for hydration tracker user
profile picture with 3-character prefix labeled.
C. Profile Picture Mining
This section outlines an attack against the hydration tracker
to obtain profile pictures of arbitrary users without access to
the device.
When the hydration tracker mobile application launches,
and periodically thereafter, it makes an unencrypted HTTP
GET request containing a unique 12-character identification
token to a manufacturer-owned server (Figure 5). If the token
matches an existing user’s picture, the server will respond with
that picture.
Because the request for the picture is unauthenticated, an
attacker can simply send requests with tokens for pictures
from arbitrary users. Although the attacker does not know
which picture tokens correspond to existing photos, they can
repeatedly attempt to guess valid tokens until the server returns
a picture.
A valid token consists of 12 characters, drawn from the up-
percase alphanumeric alphabet. The uppercase alphanumeric
alphabet has 36 entries, namely the 10 digits and the 26
uppercase letters A-Z. The number of valid tokens that can
be created from this alphabet is 3612.
It is possible to discover whether 3-character strings are
prefixes of existing tokens separately from discovering entire
tokens. The first 3 characters of a token are included twice
in a GET request URL, first as a separate prefix string and
then in the entire token (Figure 5). An HTTP 301 response
code indicates that a guessed prefix is valid, while an HTTP
404 indicates that the prefix is invalid. This ability to discover
token prefixes considerably reduces the expected runtime to
guess and verify tokens of existing user profile pictures.
An attacker would need to test 363 prefixes to discover all p
valid prefixes. This would take less than 2 hours for an HTTP
response rate of 200ms. The attacker would then need to test
p×369 suffixes to obtain the profile photos of all users of the
hydration tracker. This would take more than 105 years with
the same response rate—far too long for a reasonable attack.
However, the attacker may be satisfied with finding only a
fraction of all the profile pictures. In this case, the expected
runtime of the algorithm scales down proportionally to the
desired fraction.
Furthermore, an attacker could also parallelize the attack by
testing guessed tokens on many machines. Care would have to
be taken in seeding the pseudorandom number generators of
different instances of the algorithm to minimize overlap during
the permutation of the tokenspace.
In spite of the combinatoric infeasibility of testing all pos-
sible picture tokens, the fact that any user profile photos could
be recovered by an attacker raises serious privacy concerns.
5D. Violations of COPPA and Privacy Policy
The hydration tracker violates COPPA in two ways. First
and foremost, the profile picture mining attack and its enabling
vulnerabilities allow unaffiliated actors to obtain profile pic-
tures of arbitrary users without access to the device. Since this
device is targeted towards children, and user profile photos
are likely of children, this vulnerability is in clear violation
of COPPA section 312.8, namely that the manufacturer must
have ”reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality,
security, and integrity of personal information collected from
children” and ”take reasonable steps to release children’s
personal information only to service providers and third parties
who are capable of maintaining the confidentiality, security
and integrity of such information” [2].
The hydration tracker also violates COPPA’s data retention
policy. After changing the photo associated with a given
profile to a new picture, the URL used to retrieve the old
photo still works. This violates COPPA section 312.10, which
mandates that the manufacturer ”shall retain personal infor-
mation collected online from a child for only as long as
is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the
information was collected” and that the manufacturer ”must
delete such information using reasonable measures to protect
against unauthorized access to, or use of, the information in
connection with its deletion” [2].
The hydration tracker also violates its own privacy policy
with the vulnerabilities in Section IV-B. The privacy policy
states that users’ personal information is ”contained behind
secured networks. . . accessible by a limited number of persons
who have special access rights” and is ”encrypted via Secure
Socket Layer (SSL) technology.” These assertions are clearly
false.
V. SMART PET
The smart pet is a non-connected plush toy with a com-
panion mobile application, available on both iOS and Android
platforms. Upon creating an account through the user interface,
a virtual “pet” verbally prompts the user for their name
and birthday. Afterwards, the user inserts the phone into the
plush toy and plays with it in interactive skits. The smart
pet was released in 2013, and the mobile application has
10,000+ installs from the Google Play store as of July 2018.
The company which originally made the smart pet has since
partnered with a major global toy manufacturer (top five
worldwide by revenue) and continues active development of
new smart pet versions.
A. Network Behavior
Because the smart pet system is a standalone mobile ap-
plication, it can speak the same network protocols as the
smartphone. On the Android platform, the application requests
permissions to access and change WiFi connectivity state. The
description of the application in the Google Play store states
that Bluetooth capability is necessary for certain features.
Decompiling the binary revealed two imported libraries for
third party analytics platforms, Google Analytics and Crash-
lytics. Summary conversation and endpoint statistics reveal
Fig. 6: Hosts communicating with smart pet by percentage of
bytes transferred over a 4-minute traffic recording.
Fig. 7: Secret constants stored in plaintext in the smart pet
source code.
that the smart pet communicates with approximately 6 remote
hosts (Figure 6). The hosts are comprised of manufacturer-
owned servers, third-party analytics platforms, Microsoft news
services, and a large content distribution network. Sessions
to Microsoft news domains (msn.com) are over unencrypted
HTTP. Sessions to all other hosts are encrypted over SSL.
B. Vulnerabilities
The smart pet analysis revealed vulnerabilities involving
constant storage, encryption, and authentication.
1) Constants File Exposes Sensitive Tokens: The source
code of the smart pet contains a Java file with several constants
in cleartext (Figure 7). Most of them are innocuous; however,
two constants in particular appear to be secret tokens for the
Nook in-app purchase API:5
• NOOK ALLPACK SERVICE INAPP SECRET
• NOOK PACK SERVICE INAPP SECRET
Rather than storing these tokens in plaintext in source code,
these secret tokens should be stored in an encrypted format
and only be decrypted in memory. Otherwise, an attacker could
make API calls for in-app purchases on behalf of the client.
2) Cleartext HTTP for XML Files: The mobile application
makes unencrypted HTTP GET requests for XML files con-
taining news headlines from several Microsoft domains. An
attacker could intercept, read, and spoof these requests or
responses with little effort. In the worst case, depending on
how the XML is parsed and used, this could lead to remote
code execution. Maliciously formatted XML has been known
to cause remote code execution flaws in server software such
as Apache Struts, a vulnerability which was was exploited in
the 2017 Equifax breach [27]. The GET requests for these
XML files should be made over HTTPS to mitigate response-
spoofing attacks and snooping by malicious agents.
5The Nook API is deprecated as of March 2016, however, this toy was
available at least as early as Aug 2014, meaning this vulnerability was live
for nearly 2 years.
6Fig. 8: Hosts communicating with fitness band by percentage
of bytes transferred over a 4-minute traffic recording. No
communications with first-party servers were observed.
VI. FITNESS BAND
The fitness band consists of a wristband and an associated
mobile application. After synchronizing the wristband to the
mobile application, the user can play games inside the appli-
cation. Characters in the game are controlled by movement of
the arm wearing the wristband. The fitness band was released
in 2014, and the mobile application has 1,000+ installs from
the Google Play store as of July 2018. Active development
of the band seems to have stopped. The last update to the
mobile application occurred in 2016, but the physical band is
still available for purchase on Amazon.com as of July 2018.
A. Network Behavior
The wristband is Bluetooth enabled but has no WiFi capa-
bility. The application, by virtue of running on a smartphone,
can communicate via WiFi and Bluetooth.
Decompiling the binary to source code revealed four im-
ported third-party libraries for analytics and performance
monitoring. These include Yahoo’s Flurry Analytics, Google
Analytics, Crashlytics, and Unity 3D statistics.6
Summary conversation and endpoint statistics reveal that the
fitness band communicates significantly with approximately
3 remote hosts (Figure 8). The hosts are only third-party
analytics platforms. All connections are encrypted using SSL.
B. Vulnerabilities
No vulnerabilities were discovered in the fitness band’s
decompiled source code or its small amount of communication
with remote hosts.
VII. DISCUSSION
This section reflects on the current state of smart toy security
based on the results of this study.
A. Privacy Policy Violations
Smart toy manufacturers promise strong privacy and secu-
rity guarantees explicitly in their own privacy policies and
implicitly by adhering to COPPA, but fall short during imple-
mentation. For example, the hydration tracker’s privacy policy
6https://hwstats.unity3d.com/
claims that personally-identifiable information is protected
”behind secured networks. . . accessible by a limited number
of persons who have special access rights” and ”encrypted via
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) technology.” As shown in Sec-
tion IV, this is clearly not the case. Furthermore, this pattern of
good privacy posture being let down by weak implementation
is not unique to the toys in our study. Recently, researchers
have shown that in spite of an encryption mechanism intended
to preserve the privacy of children’s voice recordings in transit,
a particular toy’s usage of a fixed set of keys made it possible
to completely decrypt any voice communication between the
toy and its server [8].
Such violations invite legal action against the toy manu-
facturers. In January 2018, the FTC settled charges against
toy manufacturer VTech for “failing to take reasonable steps
to secure the [children’s] data it collected” and other COPPA
violations [28]. In addition to federal action, state attorneys
general have settled with technology companies for COPPA
and privacy policy violations [29]. Our results should en-
courage researchers to continue performing security analyses
of Internet-connected products and to provide information
about discovered vulnerabilities to the FTC or state attorneys
general.
B. Overlapping Third-Party Analytics
Each smart toy talks to a similar set of third-party analytics
and performance monitoring platforms. Google Analytics and
Crashlytics libraries were included in the source code of all
three toys. Yahoo’s Flurry Analytics was included in the source
code of two of the toys. This suggests that a small set of
platforms have high visibility into a broad set of smart toys.
Coupled with over-reporting of personally-identifiable infor-
mation to analytics services (Section IV-B6), these platforms
could be receiving and storing more sensitive data than users
expect.
This privacy vulnerability is similar to well-studied concerns
about third-party web tracking. The incorporation of third-
party content, such as advertisements or social media inte-
gration, on numerous web sites allows third-party companies
to track individuals’ browsing behavior across large portions
of the web [30]. If third-party analytics companies receive
data from numerous smart toys, they could similarly construct
detailed profiles of individual children’s behaviors, as well as
large-scale datasets about smart toy users of value to manu-
facturers and distributors. Further research should investigate
the proliferation of these analytics platforms across a wider
set of smart toys, as well as the extent of user information
they collect.
C. Lack of Encryption with First-Party Servers
We found several network security vulnerabilities in
communications between smart toy systems and first-party
manufacturer-owned servers, most due to lack of encryption
or authentication. In comparison, communications between
smart toy systems and third-party analytics servers were all
secure. This is likely because third-party analytics libraries
tend to be from mature companies that use encryption and
7authentication best practices, while first-party communications
are implemented by toy manufacturers without the time,
resources, or know-how to use encrypted protocols. This is
a phenomenon seen across the IoT space, as manufacturers of
physical objects with little software development experience
begin creating “smart” products.
This indicates an analogy to the early days of the web,
where encryption and other security best practices were much
less well-known and widely adopted. Web security has gradu-
ally improved due to a variety of factors, including site hosting
services with security baked-in, improved web development
libraries reducing the potential for programming errors and
simplifying SSL/TLS support, improved browser-based secu-
rity features, new versions of web standards, and more. This
comparison invites IoT researchers and manufacturers to look
to the systems that have improved web security as inspiration
for simplifying and securing IoT development.
This observation also supports the role that regulation can
play in securing smart toys and other IoT devices. The
European Union’s General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR)
encourages, but does not mandate, the use of encryption
to protect infringement (Recital 83) [31]. Industry advisory
groups have made similar recommendations for IoT device
design and development, including using “strong authentica-
tion by default” and following “security and cryptography best
practices” [32]. Mandating SSL/TLS or such best practices
would prevent vendors with little security background from
releasing devices with egregious cleartext vulnerabilities. The
availability of SSL/TLS libraries in every commonly used
language for IoT development would already prevent such
regulations from being overly burdensome to manufacturers.
Excessive manufacturer effort to implement security features
can no longer be an excuse for insecure Internet-connected
toys that place children at risk.
VIII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
While this study discovered several security vulnerabilities
and privacy policy violations, additional research is needed to
protect children from insecure Internet-connected toys.
A. Analyzing Additional Toys
The three toys we analyzed demonstrate the breadth of
network security vulnerabilities present in Internet-connected
children’s products and detectable using standard analysis
techniques. While these case studies provide further evidence
that IoT manufacturers need to place higher priority on
security and indicate specific problem areas for attention,
a comprehensive view of smart toy security would require
analyzing many additional toys and repeating these analyses
as the toys and corresponding mobile applications receive
software updates.
Since this project was focused on the three toys requested
by the state attorney general, we leave repeated analyses
of additional toys for future work. The development of an
automated auditing tool, as discussed in the following section,
would also greatly simplify the process of analyzing many
toys in parallel.
B. Automated Toy Auditing
The static and dynamic analyses we performed in this
paper mostly involved manual or custom-programmed data
inspection, whether the data was decompiled source code, pri-
vacy policies, or network traffic traces. Researchers have long
proposed and developed automated network security analysis
tools, both for IoT devices [33] and more traditional network
configurations [34], [35]. There are also many commercially-
available analysis tools which perform online and offline secu-
rity audits of network traffic or source code. However, none of
these tools connect network or code analysis with product pri-
vacy policies. The development of an automated analysis tool
for identifying device privacy and security vulnerabilities and
determining whether they constitute privacy policy breaches
would greatly reduce regulator burden, especially in the IoT
market where new devices and device updates are released
faster than they can be manually audited. However, creating
such a tool would be non-trivial, because privacy policies are
often written with intentionally vague wording that does not
directly map to concrete device behaviors [36]. A successful
automated tool would need to map privacy policy text to
verifiable security or privacy properties and check devices for
these properties.
IX. CONCLUSION
This work has examined three commercially-available IoT
toys to gain a deeper understanding of the smart toy security
and privacy landscape. Through a combination of static and
dynamic analysis, several previously undisclosed vulnerabil-
ities were discovered, including neglected encryption and
authentication, POST token reuse, sensitive user information
in crash reports, and secret keys in source code. These vulner-
abilities violate the toys’ individual privacy policies as well
as federal COPPA regulations for handling children’s data.
Additionally, a small set of third-party analytics platforms re-
ceives data from all examined toys, possibly allowing detailed
user data collection similar to third-party web tracking. These
results indicate that Internet-connected children’s toys require
continued security and privacy auditing, and that further work
is needed to help IoT toy manufacturers improve security and
privacy development practices.
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